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The Folly in Finality: The Constitutionality of ALJ Final
Decision-Making Authority in North Carolina*
The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the
State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each
other.
-N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6
The Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
-N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, two major innovations have transformed the
modern landscape of administrative law.1 First, many states have
elected to hold administrative hearings in "central panels" rather than
within regulatory agencies themselves.2 Administrative law judges
("ALJs") housed in central panels, like North Carolina's Office of
Administrative Hearings ("OAH"), are institutionally independent
from the regulatory agencies whose cases they hear, and thus provide
greater independence in the administrative hearings process.' The
second innovation, "ALJ finality," grants final decision-making
authority to ALJs.4 On June 18, 2011, the North Carolina General
Assembly voted to ratify the Regulatory Reform Act of 2011
* © 2012 Asher P. Spiller.
1. See James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALI
Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401, 401 (2005) ("States are in the vanguard of a
two-pronged revolution in administrative law.").
2. Id.; see also Hon. John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in
Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 420 (2001) (discussing "the constitutional and statutory
policies underlying the creation of the central hearing agency").
3. See Flanagan, supra note 1, at 401.
4. Id. at 402. "AU finality" may be used to refer to both "de facto" finality and "de
jure" finality. Jim Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality,
56 ADMIN L. REV. 53, 54 (2004). De jure finality exists when a state's administrative
procedure act expressly provides that AU decisions are final, giving agencies "no legal
opportunity to review the ALJ order and take action prior to appeal." Id. at 60. De facto
finality exists when "a state's APA may impose legal presumptions that, in effect, make
the AL recommendations final." Id. at 64.
2012] REGULATORY REFORM A CT 2163
("RRA"),5 which falls under this second category of innovation. The
RRA takes final decision-making authority in contested cases6 away
from regulatory agencies and gives it to ALJs housed in the OAH.7
Governor Beverly Perdue vetoed the bill, stating in her veto message
that the Attorney General had "repeatedly declared" that such a
reform was "in violation of the North Carolina Constitution."8 Less
than one-month later, Governor Perdue's veto was overridden, and
the RRA became law.9
The North Carolina General Assembly has considered giving
final decision-making authority to the OAH before. Governor
Perdue's vague assertion that the North Carolina Attorney General
had "repeatedly" found ALJ finality unconstitutional" was likely
referring to an informal opinion 1' generated in 1999 by the Attorney
General's office on a bill containing provisions nearly identical to the
5. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686-87
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)); 2 N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE 2011 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA FIRST SESSION 1047 (2011), http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites
/SenateDocuments/Journals/2011%20Senate %20Journal%20(01-26-2011)%2OVolume
%202.pdf (noting the Senate's ratification on June 18th).
6. "Contested case" is the administrative law term for a proceeding to resolve a
dispute between a regulatory agency and a party whose "rights, duties, [and] privileges,"
have been affected by agency action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(2) (2011). For example, if
the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources assesses a civil
penalty against a person who has violated a permit issued under one of North Carolina's
environmental statutes, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.1 (2011) (requiring a permit for
various activities that affect water quality), that person would have the right to a hearing
before an AU in the OAH.
7. Regulatory Reform Act, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1686-87.
8. Memorandum from Governor Beverly Eaves Perdue to Clerk of the N.C. Senate
(June 30, 2011) [hereinafter Veto Message], http://www.ncga.state.nc.us
/sessions/2011/S78lVeto/govobjections.pdf (containing Governor Perdue's objections and
veto message regarding Senate Bill 781).
9. 2 N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 5, at 1078; see also Senate Bill 781/S.L. 2011-
398 Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us
/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2011&BillID=S781&submitButton=Go
(last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (providing a history of events during the RRA's passage and
noting the veto override on July 25, 2011).
10. Veto Message, supra note 8.
11. See Letter from the N.C. Office of the Att'y Gen. to Ronald G. Penny, State Pers.
Dir., Office of State Pers. (July 6, 1999), in MARY SHUPING, CONTESTED CASES UNDER
ARTICLE 3 OF THE APA, BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OAH FINAL DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY, PRESENTED TO
THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 11
(Feb. 13, 2000) [hereinafter BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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contested case provisions in the RRA. 12 In 1999, the policy debate
surrounding the proposed revisions to the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA") was much the same as it is today. The regulated
community supported giving ALJs final decision-making authority
because it "improved their odds-leveled the playing field in their
view-in challenges to state agency action, especially over
environmental permits and fines."13 The bill's primary opponents
were the North Carolina Hospital Association, which opposed
procedural changes to certificate of need proceedings; environmental
groups; state agencies; and Governor James Hunt, who believed the
bill undermined executive branch authority. 4 Just as the policy
debate has survived, so too has the constitutional debate surrounding
AU finality.
ALJ finality poses apparent constitutional concerns. 5 First,
because of the striking resemblance of the OAH to an article IV court
under the RRA, the new law may pose a threat to judicial power.
Second, because the OAH, which has complete independence from
executive agencies, is now free to invalidate agency actions, the RRA
poses a threat to executive power. Several provisions of North
Carolina's constitution are relevant to this two-pronged constitutional
12. See H.R. 968, v.2, sec. 3, 1999 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/1999/Bills/House/PDF/H968v2.pdf ("[I]n each
contested case the administrative law judge shall make a final decision or order that
contains findings of fact and conclusions of law.").
13. Brad Miller, What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000
Amendments to the North Carolina APA, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1659 (2001).
14. Id. at 1659-60.
15. The constitutionality of AU finality in contested cases has been affirmed in one
state-Louisiana. See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2004-0882, p. 18-19 (La.
1/19/05); 893 So. 2d 746, 772. In Louisiana, not only do ALs have final say in contested
cases, but the state APA bars state agencies from seeking judicial review. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 49:992(B)(2) (2012) (providing that "in an adjudication commenced by the
division [of administrative law], the administrative law judge shall issue the final decision
or order"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:964(A)(2) (2003) (providing that "[n]o agency or
official thereof, or other person acting on behalf of an agency or official thereof shall be
entitled to judicial review under this Chapter"). In addition, the Florida First District
Court of Appeal has upheld the authority of the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH) to issue final orders in rule change proceedings. Dep't of Admin. v. Stevens, 344
So. 2d 290, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (relying on a constitutional provision allowing
the Florida legislature to grant quasi-judicial powers to a board or agency); see also Rossi,
supra note 4, at 64 (discussing the Florida court's failure to consider "alternative
functional arguments" such as whether granting decision-making authority to the DOAH
violated "separation of powers norms"). While the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in
Wooley v. State Farm and the issues raised in the national debate over ALI finality provide
some guidance to this Recent Development's analysis, the constitutionality of AL finality
in North Carolina inevitably depends upon the relevant provisions of the North Carolina
Constitution and the idiosyncrasies of North Carolina's constitutional jurisprudence.
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dilemma: article I, section 6 provides that "[t]he legislative, executive,
and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever
separate and distinct from each other,"16 and article IV, section 1
expressly prohibits the General Assembly from establishing or
authorizing "any courts other than as permitted by this Article. ' ' "l
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has noted that
"for more than 200 years, [North Carolina] has strictly adhered to the
principle of separation of powers."18 However, an important caveat to
North Carolina's "strictly adhered to" separation of powers doctrine
is that the constitution explicitly condones the delegation of certain
judicial powers to the executive branch.19 This express constitutional
allowance for some overlap between the judicial branch and the
executive branch significantly complicates the constitutional analysis.
This Recent Development explores whether the RRA violates
North Carolina's separation of powers doctrine through two different
inquiries: First, does ALJ finality unconstitutionally encroach on the
power of the judiciary? Second, does ALJ finality unconstitutionally
undermine executive branch authority? This Recent Development
first argues that ALJ finality is not an unconstitutional encroachment
on the judiciary because ALJ finality falls within the ambit of what is
"reasonably necessary" to fulfill the OAH's purpose (as it has been
statutorily re-defined by the legislature), and because the RRA stops
short of transforming the OAH into a de facto court of law. However,
this Recent Development further argues that ALJ finality is an
unconstitutional encroachment on North Carolina's executive branch
because ALJ finality vests regulatory decision-making power in an
appointee of the North Carolina judiciary, supplanting the regulatory
obligations of the Governor and executive agencies.
Part I provides background on the RRA's amendments to the
APA, outlining the changes made to ALJ decision-making authority
and judicial review of administrative decisions. Part 1I discusses the
constitutional issues associated with the judicial power granted to the
executive branch under the RRA. Part II ultimately seeks to address
whether or not the RRA usurps powers constitutionally reserved to
the judiciary either by granting judicial powers to the OAH not
16. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
17. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
18. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591,599,286 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1982).
19. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("The General Assembly may vest in administrative
agencies established pursuant to law such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary
as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were
created.").
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"reasonably necessary" to the fulfillment of its purpose or by creating
a de facto court of law. Part II also explains why the RRA would
likely survive a constitutional challenge based on this approach. Part
III argues that while the RRA may not encroach upon powers
traditionally reserved to the judiciary, the extent to which the RRA
undermines executive power is unconstitutional. First, the RRA gives
an appointee of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina the power to overrule regulatory decisions made by
appointees of the Governor and other executive branch officials.20
Second, the RRA significantly undermines executive policymaking
authority.
I. THE TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECTS OF THE RRA ON
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING
For nearly forty years, the Administrative Procedure Act2 has
provided the rules of the road for administrative adjudications in
North Carolina.22 Under the APA, a "person aggrieved" by an
administrative decision can file a petition for a contested case hearing
before an AL.23 In contrast to administrative adjudications occurring
at the federal level24 and in other states,25 in North Carolina these
hearings are not held by the administrative agency whose action is
being challenged, but by the OAH.2 6 North Carolina's choice to
house ALJs in a central panel, though executed by statute, also
affects a constitutionally sanctioned design. The constitution not only
empowers the General Assembly to confer judicial power upon
executive agencies27 but also implicitly provides for the creation of a
central panel. Article III, section 11 provides that "[r]egulatory,
quasi-judicial, and temporary agencies may, but need not, be allocated
20. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686-87
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1 to 150B-53 (2011).
22. Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691; see Charles E. Daye,
Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical
Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2001).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23 (2011).
24. See Hardwicke, supra note 2, at 419 ("Although efforts have been made from time
to time to create a central panel within the federal system, none of these efforts has gotten
off the ground.").
25. A growing number of states have elected to carry out the executive branch's
adjudicative functions before a central panel of ALJs. Rossi, supra note 4, at 57 (noting
that in 2005, twenty-six states had central panels).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (2011) (detailing the creation, status, and purpose of
the Office of Administrative Hearings).
27. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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within a principal department. ' 2' Thus, the constitution anticipates
the vesting of quasi-judicial functions in an agency set apart from the
agency whose actions are the subject of the adjudication. ALJs are
hired by the director of the OAH, the chief AU, who is appointed by
the chief justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.29
With respect to the APA's contested case provisions, controversy
has generally arisen in two related areas: (1) the decision-making
authority of regulatory agencies in contested cases; and (2) judicial
review of final decisions in contested cases. Laws effecting changes in
these areas must inevitably strike a balance between agencies'
regulatory authority and the right of litigants to receive a fair
hearing. 0 The RRA made important changes to both the decision-
making authority of state agencies in contested cases and the scope of
judicial review in contested cases. These changes are outlined below.
A. Pre-RRA Decision-Making
Prior to the enactment of the RRA, ALJ decisions were not
final. " However, agencies were restricted in their ability to reject
ALJ decisions.32 An ALJ presiding over a contested case made a
decision based on "the preponderance of the evidence, giving due
regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency
with respect to facts and inferences within the specialized knowledge
of the agency."33 After making a decision, the AJ was required to
"return the decision to the agency for a final decision."34 The agency
in making its final decision could only reject an AL's findings of fact
where they were "clearly contrary to the preponderance of the
admissible evidence, giving due regard to the opportunity of the
administrative law judge to evaluate the credibility of witnesses."35
The agency was required to adopt the overall decision of the ALJ
28. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 11 (emphasis added).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-752 (2011).
30. See Miller, supra note 13, at 1660.
31. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 6, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 1284, 1286 ("[T]he
administrative law judge shall make a decision that contains findings of fact and
conclusions of law and return the decision to the agency for final decision ... 
(amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (2011)).
32. Prior to the 2000 Amendments to the APA, agencies were unrestricted in their
ability to reverse AL decisions. AL decisions were merely "recommended decision[s]."
Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1000 (amending N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15OA-34 (2011)). For a detailed narrative of the evolution of agency decision-
making power under the APA, see Daye, supra note 22, at 1573-87.
33. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 6, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1286.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 7, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1287.
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unless it found that the ALJ decision was contrary to the
preponderance of the evidence in the record.3 6 If the agency chose
not to adopt the AL's decision, it was required to set forth its
reasoning for doing so.37 Despite these restrictions, the agency was
still empowered to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of
law and to issue a final decision.38
B. Post-RRA Decision-Making
Under the RRA, the ALJ must continue to give due regard to
the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency, but no
longer must the ALl return its decision to the agency for a final
decision.39 The agency is reduced to the role of a litigant in the
proceeding, maintaining the right to seek judicial review of the AL's
decision but not to issue a decision based on its own interpretation of
the law and view of the facts."n Thus, the RRA has taken final
decision-making authority completely out of the agency's hands and
placed it within the AL's control.
C. Pre-RRA Judicial Review
Prior to the RRA, the scope of judicial review of agency
decisions was dependent upon whether or not the agency chose to
adopt the ALJ decision. If the agency adopted the ALJ decision, an
article IV court could reverse the agency's decision if it was:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; (2) In excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) Made upon
unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by other error of law; (5)
Unsupported by substantial evidence ... in view of the entire
record . .. or (6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.41
Reviewing courts divided these grounds for reversal into two
categories: the first four grounds for reversing an agency's decision
were considered "law-based" inquiries, and the final two grounds




39. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686-87
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)).
40. See id.
41. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 11, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1291.
42. See N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d
888, 894 (2004) (citing Daye, supra note 22, at 1592 n.79).
2168 [Vol. 90
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Under the pre-RRA scheme, "law-based inquiries" received de
novo review while "fact-based inquiries" received greater deference
under the "whole record test."43 Under the de novo standard, "the
court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment."' The whole record test, on the other hand, requires an
"examination of the entire record, including the evidence which
detracts from the agency's decision,"4 but the reviewing court must
limit its inquiry to determining "whether the administrative decision
had a rational basis in the evidence. '4 6 Case law reveals no "self-
executing" test for determining whether a particular issue involves a
question of fact or a question of law,47 and judges are likely to
disagree on the matter.48 Ultimately, whether a particular issue on
review involves a question of law or a question of fact will depend
upon how much deference the judge accords the conclusions drawn
below.49 Thus, prior to the RRA, "fact-based inquiries" were matters
the court concluded should fall predominantly to the agency, whereas
"law-based inquiries" were matters the court concluded ought to
receive less deference.
In contrast, if the agency chose to reverse the ALJ decision, the
reviewing court did not distinguish between fact-based and law-based
inquiries, but rather, the entire case was reviewed de novo.50 The
application of de novo review would seem to place the ALJ decision
and the agency decision on equal footing because the judge, applying
de novo review, accorded no less deference to one decision over the
other. However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that
while de novo review permits an appellate court to make its own
findings of fact and conclusions of law, "an agency's interpretation of
a statute is traditionally accorded some deference by appellate courts
conducting de novo review."5 " The court may give "appropriate
43. Id. (citations omitted).
44. In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d
316, 319 (2003).
45. Walker v. N.C. Dep't. of Human Res., 100 N.C. App. 498, 503,397 S.E.2d 350, 354
(1990).
46. Henderson v. N.C. Dep't. of Human Res., 91 N.C. App. 527, 531, 372 S.E.2d 887,
890 (1988).
47. Daye, supra note 22, at 1593.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 1593-94.
50. See N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d
888, 894 (2004) (citing Daye, supra note 22, at 1592 n.79).
51. Rainey v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 361 N.C. 679, 681, 652 S.E.2d 251, 252
(2007) (citing N.C. Say. & Loan League v. N.C. Credit Union Comm'n, 302 N.C. 458, 465-
66, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (1981); see also Miller, supra note 13, at 1666 ("If the agency can
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weight to an agency's demonstrated expertise and consistency in
applying various statutes. 5 2
D. Post-RRA Judicial Review
The most important change to judicial review under the RRA
results naturally from the fact that the agency has been stripped of its
authority to reject the ALJ decision and issue its own decision. 3 As a
result, not only does the agency's decision no longer receive
deference under the qualified de novo standard of review as discussed
above, but the reviewing court does not even have the option of
adopting a decision made by the agency charged with executing the
regulatory program. Attorneys representing the agency may submit
an appellate brief defending the challenged agency action, but the
agency itself does not have an opportunity to review action taken by
its employees and issue a final decision. The RRA also codified the
standards judges previously applied when the agency chose to adopt
the ALJ decision.54 Where it is claimed that the ALJ decision is "[in
violation of constitutional provisions," "[i]n excess of ... statutory
authority or jurisdiction," "[m]ade upon unlawful procedure," or
"[a]ffected by other error of law," the court must apply the de novo
standard of review.55 Where it is claimed that the ALJ decision is
"[u]nsupported by substantial evidence" or is "[a]rbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion," the court applies the whole record test. 6
II. THE RRA AND POWERS RESERVED TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
When the legislature first considered giving ALJs final decision-
making authority in 1999, the constitutional debate was largely
framed by the question of whether the RRA granted too much
judicial authority to the executive branch.57 This question continues
show that the agency has consistently applied that interpretation of the law... then the
agency's interpretation should be accorded [deference] .... ).
52. Rainey, 361 N.C. at 681, 652 S.E.2d at 252 (emphasis added).
53. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686
("In each contested case the administrative law judge shall make a final decision ..
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (2011)).
54. Id. § 27, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1689-90.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Thomas F. Moffitt & Mary Penny Thompson, Finality of ALJ Hearings,
in BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS, supra note 11, at 20, 28 (arguing that
proposed version of House Resolution 968 is unconstitutional because it creates a de facto




to be the focal point in the constitutional debate surrounding the
RRA. This Part discusses two arguments as to why the RRA is
unconstitutional based on this approach. The first argument focuses
on whether the RRA fulfills the constitutional requirement that
executive agencies only be granted judicial powers that are
"reasonably necessary" to fulfill their purpose. The second argument
focuses on whether the RRA turns the OAH into a de facto court.
For reasons stated below, this Recent Development argues that the
RRA does not exceed either of these limits, and thus is not an
impermissible encroachment on powers constitutionally reserved to
the judiciary.
A. ALJ Finality is "Reasonably Necessary" for the OAH to Fulfill Its
Purpose
One argument raised by opponents of ALJ finality in 1999, and
which has resurfaced with the enactment of the RRA, is that final
decision-making authority falls outside of the scope of the OAH's
statutory purpose.56 Article IV, section 1 states that the "judicial
power of the State shall, except as provided in Section 3 of this Article,
be vested in the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a
General Court of Justice."5 9 In turn, article IV, section 3 permits the
General Assembly to "vest in administrative agencies ... such judicial
powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the
accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were
created."6 In State ex. rel. Lanier v. Vines,61 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina explained that the question of whether a judicial
power is reasonably necessary as incident to the accomplishment of
the purpose for which an administrative office or agency was created
must be determined "in each instance in the light of the purpose for
which the agency was established and in the light of the nature and
extent of the judicial power undertaken to be conferred."'62
The first step in the Lanier analysis thus requires identifying the
purpose for which the OAH was created. Section 7A-750 of the North
Carolina General Statutes provides:
There is created an Office of Administrative Hearings. The
Office of Administrative Hearings is an independent, quasi-
58. Id. at 28.
59. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 3 (emphasis added).
61. 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968).
62. Id. at 488, 164 S.E.2d at 161.
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judicial agency under Article III, Sec. 11 of the Constitution
and, in accordance with Article IV, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution .... The Office of Administrative Hearings is
established to ensure that administrative decisions are made in
a fair and impartial manner to protect the due process rights of
citizens who challenge administrative action and to provide a
source of independent administrative law judges to conduct
administrative hearings in contested cases.. . and thereby
prevent the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial
functions in the administrative process.63
Thomas Moffitt, the former Special Deputy Attorney General
who co-authored the 1999 Attorney General opinion finding ALJ
finality unconstitutional, has argued that the "OAH was created to
provide ALJs to serve a supporting function for other agencies...."I
Yet a plain reading of the statute supports a different view, namely
that the purpose of the OAH is to provide heightened levels of
fairness, independence, and due process in administrative hearings
and to preserve the independent functions of each governmental
branch.65 An examination of the history of the statutory language
supports this interpretation. In 2000, the General Assembly changed
the description of the OAH personnel from "hearing officers" who
"preside in administrative cases" to "administrative law judges" who
"conduct administrative hearings."66 Also, prior to 2000, section 7A-
750 did not contain any reference to due process. 67 Therefore, it
would be unwise to interpret the purpose of the OAH as providing a
mere "supporting function" when the legislature apparently intended
to highlight the AL's role as "judge" and the importance of due
process to the purpose of the OAH. The General Assembly also
intended for the OAH to prevent "the commingling of legislative,
executive, and judicial functions."6 One possible interpretation of
this clause is that the OAH was created to assure "that the same
person within the agency does not turn out to be investigator,
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (2011) (emphasis added).
64. Thomas F. Moffitt, The New Contested Case-Administrative Law Judge As Final
Decision Maker-Is this Constitutional?, in REGULATING THE REGULATORS: NEW
LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS III-A-4, III-A-9
(2011) (emphasis added) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
65. See Memorandum from Karen Cochrane Brown, Staff Att'y, Research Div.,
Legislative Serv. Office, N.C. Gen. Assembly, to Speaker Tillis & President Pro Tempore
Berger (July 7, 2011) (quoting § 7A-750) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
66. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 2, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 1284, 1285 (codified as
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prosecutor, and judge-all in the same case."69 Thus, to interpret the
function of the OAH without reference to the limits the General
Assembly imposed on agency control over contested cases is to ignore
a major policy choice.
The second step in the Lanier analysis requires determining the
"nature and extent" of the judicial power conferred upon the OAH.
As discussed in Part I, the RRA charges the OAH with making
findings of fact and conclusions of law and issuing final decisions in
contested cases, which are subject to judicial review.7 ° However, the
OAH does not have the power to enforce its own decisions. The
OAH is reliant upon the judiciary to provide injunctive relief and
impose civil penalties.7
Having performed the analytical steps required by Lanier, it is
now possible to answer the question: Is the grant of final decision-
making authority to the OAH reasonably necessary for the purpose
of providing fair and independent adjudication and greater due
process in order to prevent the commingling of the three branches of
government? The requirements of due process alone do not
necessitate the grant of final decision-making authority. In Harrell v.
Wilson County Schools,72 the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated
that "[t]he fact that an administrative tribunal acts in the triple
capacity of complainant, prosecutor and judge is not violative of the
requirements of due process."73 In other words, even if the agency
itself were conducting the administrative hearing, and thus acting as
complainant, prosecutor, and judge, due process would not be
violated. It follows that were due process all that section 7A-750
sought to accomplish, ALJ finality would not be "reasonably
necessary... to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the
OAH was created. 74
However, with regard to the OAH's purpose in achieving
fairness and independence in administrative decision-making, the
argument for ALJ finality seems more convincing. In his article on
69. Daye, supra note 22, at 1576.
70. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686-87
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)).
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-756(3) (2011) (giving ALIs the authority to apply to
the Superior Court for an order to enforce their powers); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
240 (2011) (giving the General Court of Justice original jurisdiction over all civil matters);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-245 (2011) (giving the Superior Court jurisdiction over civil actions
for injunctive relief compelling enforcement of statutes).
72. 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982).
73. Id. at 266, 293 S.E.2d at 691 (citation omitted).
74. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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the 2000 amendments to the APA, Professor Charles Daye analyzed
data on the outcomes of administrative hearings in the OAH from
1985 through 1999. His analysis showed that agencies prevailed in
front of ALJs seventy-five percent of the time and when agencies lost,
they rejected the ALJ's decision nearly half of the time.75 Daye
observed that the regulated community could reasonably believe "the
deck was stacked against them. ' 76 Daye's analysis suggests, at the
very least, that the General Assembly could reasonably conclude that
preventing the agency from rejecting an ALJ decision enhances the
independence and fairness of the administrative hearing process. 77
The standard by which the necessity of vesting judicial powers in
executive agencies must be evaluated is one of reasonableness-not
strict necessity. A proper reading of the requirement thus accords
some leeway to the General Assembly in determining what is
reasonably necessary. Because it was reasonable for the General
Assembly to conclude that ALJ finality enhances the fairness and
independence of the administrative hearing process, AU finality
would likely pass the "reasonably necessary" test as articulated by the
supreme court in Lanier.78
75. Daye, supra note 22, at 1611.
76. Id. But see Richard Whisnant, Apology for the Final Agency Decision, in
REGULATING THE REGULATORS: NEW LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS V-A-14 (2011) (arguing that statistics do not necessarily suggest
agency bias but rather "that the agency usually makes the right decision to begin with")
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Some scholars argue that "a high agency
success rate should be expected in an efficient enforcement system." Flanagan, supra note
1, at 422 (arguing that litigants are frustrated with giving agencies final decision making
authority not because agency decision-making is unfair, but because "the laws and
regulations prohibit the conduct under review"); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 346 (1976) ("Bare statistics rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a
decision-making process." (emphasis added)).
It is also important to note that sometimes the party challenging the agency
decision is not a "regulated party" in the traditional sense, but rather, has been affected
indirectly by the agency action. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 150B-2(6) (2011) (" 'Person
aggrieved' means any person.., directly or indirectly affected.. . by an administrative
decision." (emphasis added)). For example, in Anson County Citizens Against Chemical
Toxins in Underground Storage v. North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural
Resources, a citizens group challenged the issuance of a permit to a company seeking to
build a solid waste landfill. 167 N.C. App. 341, 341, 606 S.E.2d 350, 351 (2004). The ALJ
found the agency had had "acted erroneously, failed to follow proper procedure, acted
arbitrarily or capriciously, and failed to act as required by law or rule" in deciding to issue
the permit. Id. at 342, 606 S.E.2d at 352. However, after the AU issued its ruling, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources chose not to adopt the AU's
findings. Id.
77. See Daye, supra note 22, at 1611.
78. In Part III, this Recent Development discusses how the power to make final
decisions in contested cases often involves deciding questions of regulatory policy. While
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B. The RRA Does Not Turn the OAH into a De Facto Court of Law
Another argument for finding the RRA unconstitutional is that it
turns the OAH into a de facto court of law.79 While the General
Assembly may grant an executive agency judicial powers that are
reasonably necessary for the fulfillment of a statutory purpose,8 the
proposition that the General Assembly cannot do so to the extent
that it creates a de facto court of law should be relatively
uncontroversial. Article IV, section 1, prohibits the General
Assembly from depriving the judicial branch of any "power or
jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it."81 Were the OAH to function
as a de facto court of law, the General Assembly would have deprived
the judicial branch of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the General
Assembly may not grant judicial power to the extent that the OAH is
elevated beyond the status of a "quasi-judicial agency," as defined in
section 7A-750. s' Were the OAH to function as a de facto court of
law, it would no longer be a "quasi-judicial agency." Although the
North Carolina Constitution certainly allows for significant overlap
between the executive and judicial branch, the OAH may not
perform duties that the constitution reserves solely to the judiciary.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has previously affirmed
ALJ finality under certain circumstances-vitiating the argument that
the OAH has become a de facto court. In Employment Security
Commission v. Peace,83 the court upheld the right of ALJs to issue
final decisions in cases deferred by a federal agency, the Equal
this Recent Development does not pursue it, there is an argument to be made that
deciding policy matters goes beyond the scope of what is "reasonably necessary" to the
purpose for which the OAH was created. See, e.g., Moffitt & Thompson, supra note 57, at
28. This Recent Development approaches this problem through the lens of the separation
of powers doctrine. Part III will attempt to show that while the North Carolina
Constitution allows the legislature to vest judicial powers in an executive agency, because
a judicial appointee directs the OAH, it cannot do so to the extent that it gives the OAH
control over executive policymaking functions.
79. See Letter from the N.C. Office of the Att'y Gen. to Ronald G. Penny, State Pers.
Dir., Office of State Pers. (July 6, 1999), in BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS,
supra note 11, at 12 ("[Wlhen the General Assembly vests a power constitutionally
reserved to the judiciary in an administrative agency, it creates a court in violation of
Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution."); Moffitt, supra note 64, at 29 ("Granting AIs the
authority to make final agency decisions also would convert OAH into a de facto court
system in violation of Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution of North Carolina.").
80. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
81. Id. § 1.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (2011); see also Letter from the N.C. Office of the
Att'y Gen. to Ronald G. Penny, supra note 79, at 13.
83. 128 N.C. App. 1,493 S.E.2d 466 (1997).
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Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 4 This matter
arose from a petition filed by the North Carolina Employment
Security Commission ("ESC") seeking judicial review of an ALJ final
decision reinstating an employee, Peace, who had filed a retaliatory
discharge claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.85 The
ESC argued that by making a final decision in the case, the OAH was
"functioning as a court in violation of N.C. Const. art. IV, §1. ' ' 86 The
court concluded that "because OAH was established as part of the
executive branch pursuant to N.C. Const. art. III, §11, it is not a court,
and does not function as such when making final agency decisions on
charges deferred from EEOC."87 Proponents of the de facto court
argument have contended that when ALJs find facts, apply the law to
the facts, and decide the outcome of controversies, they act as courts
in the exercise of "the power of Judging. '8 8 While the Peace decision
should not be understood to validate all instances of ALJ finality,89 it
does implicitly reject this line of argument. In Peace, the OAH
exhibited all of the characteristics said to belong to a de facto court.
The ALJ made findings of facts, applied the law to the facts, and
decided the outcome of controversy, issuing a final agency decision
that Peace be reinstated. 90
The precise question of whether ALJ finality turned a central
panel into a de facto court was also discussed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Wooley v. State Farm.91 While many of the
84. While the RRA constitutes a significant expansion of OAH authority, the OAH
has always had final decision-making authority in a few exceptional cases. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-759(e) (2011) (providing that in its role as deferral agency for cases
deferred by the EEOC, the OAH has authority to issue a "final agency decision [that] is
binding on the parties").
85. Peace, 128 N.C. App. at 5-6, 493 S.E.2d at 469.
86. Id. at 7, 493 S.E.2d at 470.
87. Id. at 8-9, 493 S.E.2d at 471 (citing Utils. Comm'n v. Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416,
422, 142 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1965)) ("Administrative agencies... are distinguished from courts.
They are not constituent parts of the General Court of Justice.").
88. Letter from the N.C. Office of the Att'y Gen. to Ronald G. Penny, supra note 79,
at 12 (quoting State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 597, 286 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1982)).
89. See infra note 120 (arguing that the ruling in this case is not dispositive with
respect to the separation of powers argument discussed in Part III).
90. Peace, 128 N.C. App. at 5, 493 S.E.2d at 469.
91. 2004-0882, p. 5 (La. 1/19/05); 893 So. 2d 746, 753. In Wooley, the Louisiana
Supreme Court heard a Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed by the Louisiana
Commissioner of Insurance alleging that Louisiana's APA was unconstitutional (the
Commissioner could not seek direct judicial review of the AU decisions because the
Louisiana APA prohibits state agencies from seeking judicial review of administrative
rulings). Id. at p. 6; 893 So. 2d at 753. The petition stemmed from an administrative
hearing in which an ALl found that the Department of Insurance had erred in failing to
approve a Rental Condominium Unit owners' policy form (RCU form) submitted by State
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constitutional provisions at issue in Wooley differ significantly from
those at issue in North Carolina, the court's rationale and discussion
of this precise question present a convincing argument for why the
OAH might not be considered a de facto court under the RRA.
Louisiana, like North Carolina, has a central panel agency-the
Division of Administrative Law ("DAL").92 The Louisiana APA
delegates authority to conduct adjudications for certain agencies to
the DAL and provides that those agencies shall have no authority to
override the DAL's decision or the order of the ALJ employed by the
DAL.93 Furthermore, unlike the North Carolina APA, the Louisiana
APA precludes agencies from seeking judicial review of adverse
rulings issued by the DAL.
94
A Louisiana district court found the Louisiana APA
unconstitutional on various grounds, including that it "divest[ed] the
district courts of original jurisdiction by creating a new and
independent judiciary within the executive branch." 95 In other words,
the district court essentially concluded that the Louisiana APA
created a de facto court of law within the executive branch. The
Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the DAL differed
in constitutionally significant ways from a court in the judiciary. 96
First, the court explained that the DAL's decisions did not have the
force of law: "ALJs do not have the power to enforce their decisions
and orders, a power that unquestionably lies in Article V courts." 97
Second, the court found significant the fact that the DAL's rulings
occurred in what the court called a "regulatory context." 98 The court
concluded that "[w]hile the adjudicative and fact-finding powers
exercised by the ALJ mimic those exercised by Article V courts,...
Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. Id. at p. 2-4, 751-52. The Department of
Insurance determined that the RCU form filing "did not comply with applicable sections
of the Insurance Code." Id. at p. 3; 893 So. 2d at 751-52. The AU presiding in the case
disagreed, finding that the RCU form "complied in wording and meaning with the
applicable law," and so ordered the Department of Insurance to approve the RCU form.
Id. at p. 4; 893 So. 2d at 752.
92. See id. at p. 1; 893 So. 2d at 750.
93. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992(B)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing that "in
an adjudication commenced by the division [of administrative law], the administrative law
judge shall issue the final decision or order").
94. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:964(A)(2) (2006) (providing that "[nlo agency or
official thereof, or other person acting on behalf of an agency or official thereof shall be
entitled to judicial review under this Chapter").
95. Wooley, 2004-0882 at p. 20; 893 So. 2d at 762.
96. Id. at p. 23-24; 893 So. 2d at 764.
97. Id. at p. 23; 893 So. 2d at 764.
98. Id. at p. 22; 893 So. 2d at 763.
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they occurred in the regulatory context and were a quasi-judicial
function rather than a strictly judicial function."99 The court therefore
concluded, "the Act does not confer judicial power on an executive
branch agency."10
Notwithstanding the differences between the Louisiana
Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution, the rationale
underlying the Wooley court's conclusions can be easily applied to the
question of whether the OAH constitutes a de facto article IV court
under the RRA. Like the Louisiana DAL, the OAH is reliant upon
the judiciary for enforcement of its decisions, and, to the extent that
the DAL can be said to adjudicate within a "regulatory context," the
OAH functions in a regulatory context as well. These key differences
between the OAH and article IV courts-the OAH's limited
jurisdiction and lack of enforcement power-provide compelling
reasons for concluding that ALJ finality does not pose a threat to
powers reserved to the judiciary under the constitution.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' reasoning in Peace,"1
along with surviving limits on OAH authority-limits which the
Louisiana Supreme Court found so crucial to its analysis in Wooley-
provide persuasive reasons for rejecting the de facto court of law
argument discussed above. Yet the proposition that ALJ finality does
not unconstitutionally strip the judicial branch of authority does not
necessarily mean that the separation of powers analysis will not yield
a different result when focused on potential threats to executive
authority. Thus, this Recent Development considers whether AL
finality impermissibly undermines powers constitutionally reserved to
the executive branch in Part III.
99. Id.
100. Id. at p. 22-23; 893 So. 2d at 763.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
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III. THE RRA AND POWERS RESERVED TO THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH1 02
In North Carolina, a potent history of distrust for executive
power is traceable to the mid-18th century, when Royal Governors'
unbridled authority over all aspects of government incensed the
colonists into revolution. 03 In 1776, the fledgling state chose to
severely limit the Governor's power, ratifying a constitution under
which the legislature elected the Governor' °4 as well as a seven-
person council to "advise the Governor in the execution of his
office."105
The institutional effects of this distrust for executive power
subsisted long after North Carolina's nascent years, even as the state
distanced itself from its colonial past. As a frustrated Governor James
G. Martin remarked as recently as 1985 during a North Carolina
House of Representatives committee hearing on the gubernatorial
veto, "I understand the 18th century concern about Royal Governors
and how that carried over into the early 19th century. It is now
nearing the end of the 20th century: they are not coming back. We
have not had a Royal Governor for 209 years. We won!"'
Nevertheless, a 1991 study ranked North Carolina's Governor as the
102. Part III of this Recent Development is primarily informed by the policy
arguments of administrative scholars who oppose ALJ finality. Several scholars have
voiced concerns that AI finality violates separation of powers norms but none has
analyzed the constitutional implications of ALJ finality in any particular jurisdiction. For
example, Professor Jim Rossi contends that courts have failed to consider what he terms
"alternative functional arguments" when considering AU finality; for instance, "whether
giving ALJs the authority to issue final adjudicative decisions undermines the legislature's
delegation of regulatory authority to administrative agencies or interferes with core
executive branch functions considered essential to accountability under separation of
powers norms." Rossi, supra note 4, at 65. While Rossi notes the potential for alternative
functional arguments, he focuses his analysis on the potential for remedying problems
associated with ALJ finality through judicial review. Id. at 66. See generally Flanagan,
supra note 1, at 429 (arguing that judicial deference to ALJ final decisions should be
limited to questions of "historical or empirical facts, or those dependent upon credibility
determinations by the ALJ"); Frank Sullivan, Jr., Some Questions to Consider Before
Indiana Creates a Centralized Office of Administrative Hearings, 38 IND. L. REV. 389
(2005) (arguing that AU finality is inconsistent with the traditional prerogatives of the
executive branch).
103. Ran Coble, Pro: North Carolina Should Adopt a Gubernatorial Veto, N.C.
INSIGHT, Mar. 1990, at 13, http://www.nccppr.org/drupal/sites/default/files
/protected/insight-article/pdf/PRO-NCShould-Adopt-a GubernatorialVeto.pdf.
104. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 15.
105. Id. § 16.
106. See Coble, supra note 103, at 13.
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third least powerful Governor in the country, °7 and it wasn't until
1996 that North Carolina became the last state to give its Governor
the veto power.1°8
Advocates of executive authority in North Carolina have been
mildly successful at invigorating the executive branch through
constitutional revision. 109 However, a lingering distrust of executive
power, political differences between the General Assembly and
executive branch officials,10 and rampant frustration amongst
members of the business community 1' has led the General Assembly
to place further restrictions on executive authority through the RRA.
The legislature's success at eliminating executive decision-
making authority in contested cases through the RRA was perhaps
made easier by the fact that the text of the constitution is largely
silent with respect to the content of "executive power." In fact, what
constitutes executive power is mostly left to the General Assembly.
While article III, section 5 provides that "[t]he Governor shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed," it also states that "the
General Assembly shall prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of
the administrative departments and agencies of the State .... ""2 This
107. Thad L. Beyle, The Powers of the Governor in North Carolina: Where the Weak
Grow Strong-Except for the Governor, N.C. INSIGHT, Mar. 1990, at 27, 43,
http://www.nccppr.org/drupal/sites/default/files/protected/insight-article/pdf/The-Powers-
of-the Governor of NC.pdf.
108. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22; see also Last Governor Without Veto Could Get It, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at 27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/12/us/last-
governor-without-veto-could-get-it.html.
109. See Arch T. Allen, III, A Study in Separation of Powers: Executive Power in North
Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2067-69 (1999).
110. In November of 2010, Republicans took control of the North Carolina General
Assembly for the first time in over a century. See Lynn Bonner & Michael Miesecker,
GOP Takes the General Assembly, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Nov. 3, 2010, at
1A, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/1 1/03/777711/gop-takes-the-general-
assembly.html. The next year, Governor Beverly Perdue, a Democrat, would exercise her
veto power more times than any previous North Carolina Governor. Fannie Flono, Gov.
Bev Perdue and Women in Politics, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 27, 2012, at 11A,
available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/01/27/2962272/gov-bev-perdue-and-
women-in-politics.html.
111. Cf. Miller, supra note 13, at 1659 (noting the business lobbies' support for
revisions to the APA in 2000 limiting agency decision-making authority).
112. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(10) ("The General Assembly shall prescribe the
functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State
and may alter them from time to time, but the Governor may make such changes in the
allocation of offices and agencies and in the allocation of those functions, powers, and
duties as he considers necessary for efficient administration."). Article III, section 5,
subsection 8 of the state constitution provides that the Governor shall "nominate ... all
officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for." Id. However, the state's
supreme court has interpreted this clause to mean not otherwise provided for by the
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imbalance in constitutional authority leaves the executive vulnerable
to incremental encroachments upon the regulatory functions
traditionally reserved to the executive branch.1 13 This vulnerability is
evidenced by the legislative evolution of the APA and significant
growth in OAH power.114 The three major revisions to contested case
procedure under the APA-in 1985, 2000, and 2011-have each
significantly reduced the authority of state agencies in the context of
administrative adjudication. 1 5
Yet while the constitution gives the General Assembly authority
to define the scope of regulatory programs, North Carolina's
separation of powers jurisprudence makes clear that the General
Assembly may not vest in other branches powers that undermine the
executive branch's constitutional obligation to execute those
programs. 6 Under the RRA, ALJs make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and issue final decisions in contested cases,"'
leaving state agencies without the opportunity to render decisions
concerning the regulatory programs they administer.' When courts
review ALT decisions, they show the same deference previously
accorded to regulatory agencies under prior versions of the APA." 9
This Part argues that ALJ finality undermines authority
constitution or by statute. See State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 524, 359 S.E.2d
783, 787 (1987). The General Assembly therefore has the power to vest the authority to
appoint the Governor's own officers in someone other than the Governor. Id.; see, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (2011) (vesting the power to appoint the chief ALJ in the chief
justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina).
113. See Karen Cochrane-Brown, The Constitutionality of Administrative Law Judges
as Final Decision Maker, in REGULATING THE REGULATORS: NEW LEGISLATIVE
RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS III-A-16 (Oct. 27, 2011) ("The
Constitution provides that the General Assembly shall determine what agencies are
created and what their relative functions, powers and duties shall be.") (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
114. The three major revisions to the APA have incrementally increased the power of
the OAH. ALT decisions under the APA began as "recommended decisions" under the
1985 revisions to the APA. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987,
1000 (amending the now codified N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)). AL~s were then
allowed to make decisions, but required to accord state agencies deference under the 2000
amendments to the APA. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, § 11, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 1284,
1286 (requiring Al~s to decide the case with "due regard to the demonstrated knowledge
and expertise of the agency"). Today, ALT decisions are "final decision[s]" under the
RRA. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686
(codified as amended at § 150B-34).
115. See supra Part 1.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
117. Regulatory Reform Act, ch. 398, § 18.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1689-90 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51 (2011)).
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constitutionally reserved to the executive branch by vesting in an
appointee of the chief justice the power to overrule regulatory
decisions made by executive officers, and by stripping state agencies
of policymaking authority required for the enforcement of state
regulatory programs. 120
A. The Express Separation of Powers Doctrine in North Carolina
Unlike the Federal Constitution, the North Carolina
Constitution contains an express provision mandating the separation
of the three branches of government. 21 There are two foundational
cases interpreting this constitutional provision: State ex rel. Wallace v.
Bone 22 and Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers.123 In Bone,
the court considered whether legislators, serving in the General
Assembly, could serve as members of a statutorily created agency
within the executive branch-specifically the Environmental
Management Commission. 124 The court stated that North Carolina
has "strictly adhered to the principle of separation of powers.., for
more than 200 years" and that separation of powers principles "do
not tolerate legislative encroachment or control over the function and
power of the executive branch.'' 25 The court concluded that once the
legislature creates a government body to implement a regulatory
program it cannot "retain some control over the process of
implementation by appointing legislatures to the governing body of
the instrumentality.' 2 6
In Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, the advising
justices stated that under article III, section 5(3), which provides for
the administration of the state budget by the Governor, and under
article I, section 6, the separation of powers provision, the Governor,
not the General Assembly, controls transfers within the budget and
120. In Employment Security Commission of North Carolina v. Peace, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of AU finality when the OAH
functioned as a deferral agency for cases deferred by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (a federal agency). 128 N.C. App. 1, 7-9, 493 S.E.2d 466, 470-71 (1997). This
case did not involve OAH review of a state agency's regulatory action. Because the OAH
itself was functioning as a principal agency, OAH's final decision-making authority did not
threaten the regulatory authority of other state executive agencies. Id.
121. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
122. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
123. 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982).
124. Bone, 304 N.C. at 606-07, 286 S.E.2d at 87-88.
125. Id. at 599-601, 286 S.E.2d at 83-84 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
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disbursement of federal block grants to the state. 127 The justices noted
that the principle of separation of powers is one to which the people
of North Carolina are "firmly and explicitly" committed. 128 Thus, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has made clear that it is a
fundamental principle of the constitution that one branch of
government may not "encroach upon" or "control" the "functions
and power" of another branch of government.
B. The Appointment of the Director of the OAH by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court
How can the enhanced power of the OAH be said to encroach
upon executive power when the OAH itself is an executive branch
agency? Insofar as the OAH was established pursuant to article III,
section 11, the OAH is an executive agency. However, this distinction
is largely administrative. 2 9 Not only does the OAH bear several
hallmarks of an article IV court, 3 ' but the chief justice of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, not the Governor, appoints the
chief ALJ.13 This "executive agency" therefore has no accountability
whatsoever to any authority within the executive branch. Because the
General Assembly vested authority in the chief justice to appoint the
most senior officer of OAH, the separation of powers doctrine, as
articulated by the supreme court in Bone,132 should be applied to
alterations in the duties and functions of the OAH.
1. Martin v. Melott and the Appointment Power
North Carolina's decision to vest the power to appoint the chief
AiU in the chief justice stands in contrast to other states where the
Governor possesses that power.133 In State ex. rel. Martin v. Melott,134
the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the constitutionality of
vesting this appointment power in the chief justice.'35 The court
127. 305 N.C. at 774-76, 295 S.E.2d at 592-94.
128. Id. at 774, 295 S.E.2d at 592.
129. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 1, at 429 (characterizing central panels as part of
the executive branch solely for "administrative purposes").
130. See supra Part II.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-752 (2011).
132. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 599,286 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1982).
133. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11370.2 (West 1992) (stating that the office of
administrative hearings is under direction of one director appointed by the Governor);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West 1997 & Supp. 2012) (creating administrative hearings
office headed by the chief ALJ, who is appointed by the Governor).
134. 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
135. Id. at 524, 359 S.E.2d at 787.
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handed down the Melott decision in response to a declaratory
judgment action brought by Governor James G. Martin challenging
the constitutionality of section 7A-752.'36 The Governor argued that
granting the power to appoint the chief ALJ to the chief justice
violated the separation of powers clause, as well as article III, section
5(8), which authorizes the Governor to appoint "all officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for." '137 A three-member
plurality13 8 affirmed the chief justice's authority to appoint the chief
ALJ. 139
The plurality opinion first addressed whether or not giving the
chief justice the power to appoint the chief ALJ violated the
Governor's constitutional right to appoint "all officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for." 140 The plurality's
holding hinged on a key doctrinal phrase, addressing whether or not
the clause "otherwise provided for" meant otherwise provided for by
the constitution or otherwise provided for by the constitution or by
statute. In a prior case, interpreting the North Carolina Constitution
of 1868, the court had stated that "the words 'otherwise provided for'
meant otherwise provided for by the Constitution."' 141  This
interpretation would suggest that only the Governor has the power to
appoint the chief ALJ, as the chief ALJ's appointment is not
"otherwise provided for by the Constitution." 142 However, after
examining the history of this provision, the plurality concluded that
prior judicial construction of the provision was not sufficiently "well
settled" to be binding on the court. 143 The plurality interpreted
"otherwise provided for" to mean otherwise provided for by the
constitution or by statute.44
Next, the plurality considered whether the appointment of the
chief ALI by the chief justice violated the separation of powers
136. Id. at 518, 359 S.E.2d at 783. Section 7A-752 of the North Carolina General
Statutes provides, "[tihe Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative
Hearings shall be appointed by the Chief Justice for a term of office of four years .... A
Chief Administrative Law Judge may continue to serve beyond his term until his successor
is duly appointed and sworn.... " § 7A-752.
137. Melott, 320 N.C. at 520, 522,359 S.E.2d at 783, 785-86.
138. After the chief justice recused himself, the court was reduced to six members.
Allen, supra note 109, at 2080. Arch T. Allen was the counsel of record in the Melott case,
representing Governor James G. Martin. 320 N.C. at 519, 359 S.E.2d at 785.
139. Melott, 320 N.C. at 520, 524, 359 S.E.2d at 785, 787.
140. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(8); Melott, 320 N.C. at 520, 359 S.E.2d at 785.
141. Melott, 320 N.C. at 521, 359 S.E.2d at 785.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 524, 359 S.E.2d at 787.
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clause. 145 Despite the apparent relevance of Wallace and In Re
Separation of Powers, the plurality stated, without explanation,
"Wallace is not authority for this case. ' 146 According to the plurality,
the statute could only be said to violate the separation of powers
doctrine if "appointment of the [chief ALJ] is the exercise of
executive power." '' "[E]xecutive power," the plurality explained,
means "the power of executing the laws," and "[t]he appointing of
someone to execute the laws does not require the appointing party to
execute the laws."' 48 Therefore, the plurality concluded, because the
chief justice's appointment of the chief ALJ did not involve the
"exercise of executive power," section 7A-752 did not violate the
separation of powers clause.'49
2. Melott in the Wake of the RRA
The power of the chief justice to appoint the chief ALJ is more
troubling today than it was at the time Melott was decided. Indeed,
one could argue that the decision reached by the plurality in Melott
and its failure to engage with separation of powers precedent may
have rested upon the limited authority of the OAH at that time. In
1987, when Melott was decided, administrative adjudications were
governed by the 1985 version of the APA, under which state agencies
were the final decision-makers in contested cases. 50 The OAH issued
"recommended decisions" and agencies had broad discretion to
accept or reject the AL's factual findings and conclusions of law. 1 '
The chief ALJ was not empowered to reverse decisions made by the
145. Id. at 522, 359 S.E.2d at 786.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 787.
148. Id.
149. Id. The wisdom of the plurality's decision in Melon is persuasively criticized by
Arch T. Allen, III, who served as counsel of record for the Governor in the case. Allen,
supra note 109. Allen argues that "American courts have recognized that the power of
appointment is an executive function and that legislative attempts to usurp that power
violate the separation-of-powers doctrine." Id. at 2070; see also State ex rel. White v.
Barker, 89 N.W. 204, 209-10 (Iowa 1902) (holding that judges cannot constitutionally
appoint agency board members); Op. of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974)
(holding that state chief justice cannot constitutionally appoint non-judicial officers or
agency board members); State ex rel. Young v. Brill, 111 N.W. 639, 651 (Minn. 1907)
(holding that district judges cannot constitutionally appoint agency board members);
Application of O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d 306, 309-10 (Mont. 1945) (holding that judicial
appointment of city attorney is unconstitutional).
150. Act of July 12,1985, ch. 746, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1000, 1000 (amending N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150A-34 (2011)).
151. Id.
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Governor and executive branch officials. 5 2 Thus, the Governor's
inability to appoint or remove the chief ALJ may not have seemed
any great threat to executive power at the time Melott was decided.
However, the new role of the OAH under the RRA brings into
stark relief the problematic nature of the supreme court's ruling in
Melott. Under the RRA, the OAH, headed by an appointee of the
chief officer of the judiciary, has the power to overrule regulatory
decisions made by the Governor and his appointees.153 The chief ALJ
no longer has the "inferior status" he once held.15a Not only do the
chief ALJ and his appointees have the power to overrule decisions
made by executive agencies, but the chief ALJ is accorded deference
by the same governmental branch responsible for his appointment.155
This is particularly troubling with respect to decisions involving
matters of regulatory policy with which the agency-and not the
OAH-has been charged with enforcing.156
Vesting the appointment power of the chief ALJ in the chief
justice thus creates a scenario in which an appointee of the judiciary is
in a position to control executive functions. Prior to the enactment of
the RRA, ALJs did not have greater authority than executive
agencies in reaching decisions in contested cases. With the enactment
of the RRA, however, an appointee of the judiciary now has greater
authority over contested regulatory decisions than the regulators
themselves. This structure of administrative decision-making presents
the "form" of the constitutional problem-the substantive
implications of the problem are discussed in Part III.C.
152. Id.
153. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1686-87
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)).
154. Under the United States Constitution, an executive officer can be appointed by a
court executive officer as an "inferior officer." N.C. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In Morrison v.
Olson, the United States Supreme Court concluded that an independent counsel,
responsible for investigating and prosecuting government officials, was an "inferior
officer" under the appointments clause. 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988). Therefore, the Court
concluded that Congress could vest the appointment power in a court. Id. at 677. The
Court also addressed the question of whether congressional "good-cause" restrictions on
removal of an independent counsel violated the principle of separation of powers. Id. at
685. To answer this question, the Court said it had to determine "whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light." Id. at 691. The Court concluded that the removal restrictions did not violate the
separation of powers because they did not interfere with the functions of the Executive
Branch. Id. at 693.
155. See Regulatory Reform Act, ch. 398, § 18.
156. See infra Part III.C.
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C. Interference with Agency Policymaking Functions
In the modern administrative state, administrative adjudications
are more than just hearings to determine the rights and obligations of
regulated parties. They play a key role in agency policy
development 5 7 and agency self-governance. 58 Adjudications also
provide an opportunity for agencies to fulfill their responsibility to
"provide explanations for [their] policy choices" and to consistently
apply interpretations of statutes and rules. 159
One context in which questions of policy arise during
administrative adjudication is statutory interpretation. North
Carolina judges have acknowledged the importance of agency policy
development by deferring to agency statutory interpretations. At the
federal level, it is a long established principle that agency statutory
interpretations require deference. 6 ° While some scholars have
criticized such deference on separation of powers grounds, 61 others
have argued that the separation of powers doctrine requires showing
deference to agency statutory interpretations. 162 These scholars
correctly recognize that regulatory agencies have a constitutional duty
to carry out the matters of regulatory policy assigned to them by the
legislature. 163 Interpreting statutory ambiguities in accordance with
157. See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary,
25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 49 (2005) (discussing the policy contributions of
administrative adjudicators).
158. Richard Whisnant, Apology for the Final Agency Decision, in REGULATING THE
REGULATORS: NEW LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS V-A-15 (2011) ("Agencies are not monolithic, even though they are
commonly depicted that way. An especially important distinction exists between
appointed and career levels .... The final agency decision serves as an important way to
force communicating between these agency sub-units." (emphasis added)) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also Flowers v. Blackbeard Sailing Club, Ltd., 115 N.C.
App. 349, 353, 444 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1994) ("The administrative body with expertise in the
subject matter of the action should be given the first opportunity to correct any errors.").
159. Rossi, supra note 4, at 65.
160. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (establishing a doctrine for according significant deference to agency
interpretations if not in conflict with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress).
161. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 621 (1996) (arguing that
Chevron's concept of deference conflicts with the judicial branch's constitutional duty to
interpret the law) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
162. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 102, at 397 ("[Tjhe agency.., is also the entity
charged under the constitutional order with carrying out the matter at issue-it is the
entity under the Constitution with primacy for executing policy on that subject.").
163. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (1984) ("The responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the
21872012]
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policy goals falls within the purview of this duty.16' At the state level,
courts do not universally accord deference to regulatory agencies'
interpretations of the statutes they implement. 165 However, in North
Carolina, courts have accorded some deference to agencies' statutory
interpretations.166
Recently in Rainey v. North Carolina Department of Public
Instruction, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the right
of a trial court when reviewing an administrative decision de novo to
"consider[] the agency's expertise, and previous interpretations of the
statutes it administers, as demonstrated in the rules and regulations
adopted by the agency or previous decisions outside of the pending
case."'167 The court found that according deference to agency
interpretations of law did not conflict with section 150B-51(c)'s
definition of the de novo standard of review, which provides that the
reviewing court "shall not give deference to any prior decision made
in the case ... .,"168 The court interpreted section 150B-51(c) to mean
only that the reviewing court could not defer to prior decisions "in the
specific case."' 169 Section 150B-51(c) does not prohibit courts from
deferring to an agency's previous interpretations of the same statute
in other cases so long as the interpretation has been consistently
applied.170
Under the RRA, ALJs must give due regard to agency expertise.
However, the opportunity to receive deference from a reviewing
public interest are not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the
political branches.'" (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978))).
164. See id. But see Hardwicke, supra note 2, at 435 ("Ideally, the agency policy, its
goals and missions, are statutorily established or published in the code of state
regulations.").
165. See Rossi, supra note 4, at 73.
166. In re Appeal of N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 302 N.C. 458, 466, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410
(1981).
167. Rainey v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 361 N.C. 679, 681, 652 S.E.2d 251, 252
(2007); see also Craven Reg'l Med. Auth. v. N.C. HHS, 176 N.C. App. 46, 58, 625 S.E.2d
837, 844 (2006) ("[W]hen a court reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute it
administers, the court should defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute ... as long
as the agency's interpretation is reasonable and based on a permissible construction of the
statute.' " (quoting Carpenter v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 107 N.C. App. 278, 279, 419
S.E.2d 582, 584 (1992))); Miller, supra note 13, at 1665-66 ("[I]f the agency's
interpretation of the law is not simply a 'because I said so' response to the contested case,
then the agency's interpretation should be accorded the same deference to which the
agency's construction of the law was entitled [prior to the 2000 amendments to the
APA].").
168. Rainey, 361 N.C. at 681, 652 S.E.2d at 251-52 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-
51(c) (2011)).
169. Id. (citing § 150B-51(c)).
170. Id.
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court is no longer available to the agency because the final decision
being reviewed belongs not to the agency but to the ALJ. 171
Furthermore, because the agency no longer has the ability to issue
final decisions in contested cases, the agency loses one of its tools for
demonstrating consistency in statutory interpretation. According to
the Rainey court, consistency in "previous decisions" provides the
basis for deference.1 71 Implicit in the Rainey court's rationale is that
consistency in the enforcement and implementation of regulatory
programs should be encouraged, not undermined, by the judicial
process.
In addition to eliminating the deference traditionally accorded to
agency statutory interpretations, the RRA also prevents agencies
from making factual determinations that involve questions of
policy. 173 While some factual inquiries involve gathering empirical
facts and making credibility determinations, non-empirical policy
171. Regulatory Reform Act of 2011, ch. 398, § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1679, 1689-90
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (2011)).
172. Rainey, 361 N.C. at 681, 652 S.E.2d at 252.
173. In North Carolina, agencies have not traditionally been accorded the same
latitude in adopting new policies through adjudication as federal administrative agencies.
The United States Supreme Court held in SEC v. Chenery Corp. that "the choice between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
the informed discretion of the administrative agency." 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (citations
omitted). In North Carolina, however, courts have placed restrictions upon an agency's
ability to make ad hoc policy determinations during litigation. In State ex rel.
Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina adopted a rule whereby agencies faced with "the alternative of proceeding by
rule making or by adjudication," should usually proceed by rulemaking. 300 N.C. 381, 416,
269 S.E.2d 547, 570 (1980). However, the supreme court held that this presumption is by
no means absolute. Agencies are permitted to make ad hoc policy decisions where "there
is a danger that [proceeding through formal rulemaking] would frustrate the effective
accomplishment of the agency's functions." Id. Thus the court acknowledged not only that
in some instances proceeding ad hoc would be permitted, but also that policymaking
through adjudication is sometimes essential to the fulfillment of agency functions. The
court cited instances where the "agency may not have had sufficient experience with a
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule,"
or where the problem is so "specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of
capture within the boundaries of a general rule." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus,
while limited as compared with the carte blanche approach to adjudicatory policymaking
at the federal level, policymaking nonetheless plays an important role in administrative
adjudication in North Carolina. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 64, at III-A-11 ("Making a
final agency decision in a contested case enables an agency ... to flesh out its
interpretation of its regulatory program and to articulate, establish and clarify its policy in
specific factual settings-all essential to effective decision-making by executive branch
agencies in order to execute the laws enacted by the executive branch."). This section
highlights how policy considerations factor into factual inquiries in subtle ways that likely
would not exceed the limits that the supreme court places on agency policymaking
through adjudication.
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determinations may also inhere in questions of fact and mixed
questions of fact and law. '74 Policy considerations emerge where a
given factual inquiry requires making value judgments in accordance
with the regulatory goals the General Assembly has authorized the
agency to pursue or determine on its own. 175
Professor Jim Rossi provides a helpful illustration of a factual
inquiry that would involve a policy judgment. 176 The example is
derived from a Florida case 7 7 in which an electrical utility sought a
permit to construct power transmission lines across protected
wetlands. 178 Under the governing statute, the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection was required to determine, based on a
variety of factors, whether the permit would be "in the public
interest. ' 179 The construction of transmission lines would have
destroyed forested wetlands but expanded herbaceous wetlands.
181
The ALJ treated the public benefits of forested wetlands and those of
herbaceous wetlands equally, and therefore determined there would
be no net adverse impact from the project.' The agency rejected the
ALJ recommendation, "weighing the adverse impact of the clear-
cutting of trees more heavily than the AL and concluding the permit
was not in the public interest."'82 On review, the Florida Court of
Appeals held that rulings about the state of certain wetlands before
and after a local power company began construction of a power line
"were within [the] discretion [of the Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Regulation] in implementing the wetlands protection
statutes."'83 Professor Rossi posed the hypothetical of the same case
arising under a regime in which ALJs have final decision-making
authority:
[An ALJ evaluating wetland mitigation associated with the
sitting of a transmission line can rely on the admissible evidence
the ALJ finds most credible and convincing. The ALJ can make
policy decisions regarding what kinds of wetlands are
important, and if the ALJ had final order authority, these final
174. Sullivan, supra note 102, at 398.
175. Id. at 393.
176. Rossi, supra note 4, at 70-71.






182. Sullivan, supra note 102, at 395.
183. Fla. Power Corp., 638 So. 2d at 561.
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decisions will then be reviewed by an appellate court without
allowing the agency more than an opportunity to participate as
a litigant in the adjudicative proceeding. The ALJ might decide
that herbaceous wetlands are somehow equivalent to forested
wetlands. Yet this is a policy issue that depends on broader
state environmental protection goals.'"
An example of a North Carolina statute that may require the
weighing of facts in accordance with policy considerations is the
North Carolina Mining Act of 1971, which directs the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") to deny a permit if it
finds that the operation of a mine "will have a significantly adverse
impact on the purposes of a publicly owned park.""1 5 In Clark Stone
Co. v. North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural
Resources,"s6 DENR revoked a mining permit because the mining
operation had a "significantly adverse impact" on the Appalachian
Trail." 7 The trial court reversed the Agency's decision despite the
existence of testimony that the mine had a "negative acoustic and
visual impact."' 8 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held inter alia
that the trial court ought to have deferred to DENR's evidentiary
findings. 8 9
184. Rossi, supra note 4, at 70-71. Indiana Supreme Court Justice Frank Sullivan, Jr.
discusses another example of the role of policymaking in administrative adjudication,
posing the following hypothetical:
One could well imagine a tavern licensing regime in which the licensing agency
was entitled to balance the economic and other benefits of awarding a license with
any negative impact on the surrounding community in its decision. The licensing
agency, perhaps on direction from the governor, might adopt a policy consistent
with the statute to give considerable weight to the position of local community
leaders in assessing impact on the surrounding community.... I think that
executive branch officials might well be concerned that central panels will create a
situation in which ... a tavern license, which an alcoholic beverage commission's
policy would grant, would otherwise be denied [or vice versa].
Sullivan, supra note 102, at 395-96.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-51(d) (2011). The Mining Act also directs the agency to
deny a mining permit if other negative impacts on the environment exist, such as impacts
on wildlife, air quality, and water quality. Id.
186. 164 N.C. App. 24, 594 S.E.2d 832 (2004).
187. Id. at 32, 594 S.E.2d at 838.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 32-33, 594 S.E.2d at 837-38. While the trial court's principal objection to
DENR's decision had to do with its statutory permit revocation authority, see id. at 33-38,
594 S.E.2d at 838-41, the trial court's evidentiary findings regarding the impact of the
mine on the Appalachian Trail demonstrates how fact finders can reach different
conclusions when looking at the same record, and how these conclusions can have varying
policy implications.
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The sort of factual determination involved in Clark Stone raises
questions of policy falling within the scope of the agency's regulatory
authority. The Mining Act directs DENR to determine whether, in its
judgment, the impacts of the mine are "significant" and whether they
are "adverse" within the context of the "purposes" for which the park
was created. 190 Under the separation of powers theory promoted by
this Recent Development, these considerations should fall to the
agency in which the authority to protect the Appalachian Trail and
the surrounding environment has been vested.
Imagine that circumstances similar to those in Clark Stone arose
under the RRA's regime. An ALJ might accord less weight to certain
testimony about the impact of a mine upon a public park than the
agency would and may have a different notion of what constitutes a
"significantly adverse impact" based on the ALJ's interpretation of
the policy underlying the statute.'91 Under the RRA, ALJ findings of
fact receive considerable deference under the "whole record test,"'1 92
which requires only that the reviewing court determine whether the
decision had some evidentiary basis. 193 So long as the reviewing court
was able to identify evidence in the record that supported the ALT's
finding, the ALT's decision would be affirmed; in other words, the
ALJ-and not the agency charged with implementing the Mining
Act-would decide how best to protect the Appalachian Trail from
disturbance.
While such deference may be appropriate for AL findings of
fact that involve "historical or empirical facts, or those dependent
upon credibility determinations,"' 194 the same cannot be said for
factual findings involving policy judgments. The traditionally
recognized interests of political accountability and expertise
protected by the separation of powers doctrine require these inquiries
to be determined by the state agencies in which the given regulatory
authority has been vested.' 95 The reservation of policy judgments to
190. § 74-51(d).
191. In fact, at the administrative level in Clark Stone, the AL did disagree with the
Agency; however, the principal dispute between the Agency and the AU had to do with
the Agency's authority under the Mining Act to revoke permits. Clark Stone Co. v. N.C.
Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. 15 N.C. Reg. 1955, 1957-60 (June 1, 2001).
192. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d 888,
894 (2004) (citations omitted).
193. Henderson v. N.C. Dep't. of Human Res., 91 N.C. App. 527, 531, 372 S.E.2d 887,
890 (1988) ("Ultimately, the reviewing court must determine whether the administrative
decision had a rational basis in the evidence." (citation omitted)).
194. Flanagan, supra note 1, at 429.
195. It is important to note that in North Carolina, ALJs have been required since the
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state agencies in administrative adjudications has ensured that such
judgments are placed in the hands of politically accountable
government officers with expertise in the relevant subject matter. 96
ALJs in North Carolina are hired as merit-appointees by the chief
ALJ, t9 and therefore are not subject to the same political
accountability constraints as high-level agency decision makers.198
Moreover, the law does not require ALJs to have any expertise in the
subject matter involved in the cases over which they preside.1 99
The constitution gives the General Assembly the authority to
grant regulatory authority to state agencies.2°° Once the vesting of
regulatory authority in state agencies has occurred, the constitution
prohibits other branches from interfering with that authority. 20 1
2000 amendments to the APA to "giv[e] due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and
expertise of the agency with respect to facts and inferences within the specialized
knowledge of the agency." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (2011). An AU may give due
regard for agency expertise by "taking official notice of facts within the specialized
knowledge of the agency .... [T]he Administrative Law Judge may see other evidentiary
avenues for establishing agency expertise such as expert-witness testimony addressing
agency expertise and, perhaps, increased agency rulemaking which codifies the agency's
specialized knowledge." N.C. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, PRACTICE BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS: AN OVERVIEW 5, available at http:/
/www.ncoah.com/admin/Practice%20Before%200AH%20-%2OAn%200verview.doc
(last visited Aug. 20, 2012). However, while the APA still requires ALJs to give due
regard for agency expertise, this requirement does not successfully mitigate RRA's
encroachment on executive power. Exactly what is required, if anything, of an AU when
giving "due regard" for agency expertise is unclear. Furthermore, given the degree of
deference that judges are required to give AU factual determinations under the RRA, it
is unlikely that an AU's failure to accord proper deference to agency expertise is
reviewable. Under the "whole record test," the AU decision need only demonstrate some
consideration of the evidence presented by the agency and provide a "reasonable"
justification for rejecting it. See supra Part I.D. Therefore, an agency would likely have
little recourse when an AU fails to recognize its expertise and rejects the agency's
weighing of the facts. When an administrative case exits the administrative environment
and enters the purview of the judicial branch, the expertise of state agencies is treated as
equivalent to the expertise possessed by a common litigant seeking relief from an adverse
judgment.
196. See Flanagan, supra note 1, at 429 ("ALJs, as generalists, often lack the knowledge
found in the collective expertise of the agency."); Rossi, supra note 4, at 65 ("By leaving
law and policy decisions in the hands of non-agency decision-makers, ALJ finality places
at risk agency accountability.").
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-753 (2011).
198. See Rossi, supra note 4, at 64 ("[Mlost ALds operate as merit appointees ... and
are not subject to the same political accountability constraints as agency heads .... ").
199. However, the chief AlA may designate certain AUs as having expertise to preside
over a particular case. § 7A-753.
200. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(10).
201. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 601, 286 S.E.2d 79, 84 ("[Tjhe
separation of powers principle [does] not tolerate legislative encroachment or control over
the function and power of the executive branch." (emphasis added)).
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Because of the fundamental changes to administrative procedure that
result from the RRA, regulatory agencies' interpretations of the
statutes they are charged with executing will no longer be accorded
deference by the courts. Policy-laden factual determinations that
depend upon agency expertise will now be made by non-expert ALJs
to whom the courts will show deference on review. Thus, by vesting in
an appointee of the judiciary the power to overrule regulatory
decisions and stripping regulatory agencies of policy-making
authority, the RRA violates North Carolina's separation of powers
clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
CONCLUSION
AU finality in North Carolina presents a unique constitutional
dilemma. The North Carolina Constitution provides that the
"legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other,"
while explicitly permitting the intermingling of the executive branch
and the judicial branch.
This Recent Development has analyzed the two main
constitutional concerns associated with ALJ finality. It has suggested
that a constitutional challenge based on the proposition that the RRA
delegates too much judicial power to OAH is suspect. Aside from the
obstacles involved in demonstrating that final decision-making
authority is not "reasonably necessary" to the broadly framed
purpose of the OAH, this approach fails to capture the significant
normative issues associated with ALJ finality. These problems are
addressed by an argument that focuses on the extent to which the
RRA strips power from the executive. Under the RRA, policy
decisions that have been traditionally recognized as belonging to the
agencies charged with enforcement of North Carolina's regulatory
programs now fall to the chief ALJ and his employees. While the
OAH plays a crucial role in administrative adjudication, the
implementation of regulatory policy is solely the province of the
executive branch. Stripping this power away from the executive
effects a weakening of this branch that the constitution does not
permit.
ASHER P. SPILLER**
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ERIC L. MULLER, A.B., J.D., Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Dan K. Moore Distinguished
Professor of Law in Jurisprudence and Ethics
CRAIG T. SMITH, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Dean for Legal Writing and Academic Success and Clinical
Professor of Law
MEREDITH L. WEISS, B.S., M.B.A., M.I.S., PH.D., Associate Dean for Administration, Finance, and
Information Technology
KRISTINE JENSEN, B.A., Associate Dean for Advancement
MICHAEL J. STATES, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean for Admissions
SYLVIA K. NOVINSKY, B.S., J.D., Assistant Dean for Public Service Programs
JOHN B. KASPRZAK, B.A., M.A.T., J.D., Assistant Dean for Student Services
LOUISE HARRIS, B.A., Assistant Dean of Alumni and Special Programs
DOUGLAS B. EDMUNDS, B.A., M.S., Assistant Dean for Information Technology
CATHERINE PIERCE, B.A., M. P.A., Assistant Dean for Policy and Special Assistant to the Dean
BRIAN D. LEWIS, B.G.S., M.A.,Assistant Dean for Career Services
PATRICIA HENNESSEY, B.S., Assistant Dean for Finance
ALLISON L. REID, B.A., M.A., Assistant Dean of Communications
Faculty
DAVID S. ARDIA, B.A., M.S., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor Law and Journalism and Mass
Communication
TAMAR R. BIRCKHEAD, B.A, J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JOHN CHARLES BOGER, A.B., M.DIv., J.D., Dean and Wade Edwards Distinguished Professor of Law
LISSA LAMKIN BROOME, B.S., J.D., Wachovia Professor of Banking Law and Director of the Center for
Banking and Finance
ALFRED L. BROPHY, A.B., J.D., A.M., PH.D., Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law
CAROL N. BROWN, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
CAROLINE NICHOLSON BROWN, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law
PATRICIA L. BRYAN, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Martha Brandis Professor of Law
BERNARD A. BURK, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
ARIA CHERNIK, B.A., M.A., PH.D., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
ANDREW CHIN, B.S., PH.D., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
JOHN MARTIN CONLEY, B.A., J.D., PH.D., William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor of Law
MICHAEL L. CORRADO, B.A., B.S., A.M., PH.D., J.D., Arch T. Allen Distinguished Professor of Law
JOHN F. COYLE, B.A., M.PHIL., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
KAREEM U. CRAYTON, A.B., PH.D., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
CHARLES EDWARD DAYE, B.A., J.D., Henry Brandis Professor of Law and Deputy Director of the Center
for Civil Rights
MAXINE N. EICHNER, B.A., J.D., M.A., PH.D., Reef C. Ivey II Professor of Law
LEWIS MOORE EVERErr, B.A., M.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
BARBARA A. FEDDERS, B.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
VICTOR B. FLATr, B.A., J.D., Thomas F. and Elizabeth Taft Distinguished Professor in Environmental Law
and Director of the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation and Resources (CLEAR)
TIMOTHY J. GALLINA, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Reference Librarian and Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
LAURA N. GASAWAY, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Paul B. Eaton Distinguished Professor of Law
DEBORAH R. GERHARDT, A.B., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, B.A., M.S., J.D., Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor in Constitutional Law and
Director of the Center for Law and Government
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, B.A., J.D., Burton Craige Professor of Law
MARGARET F. HALL, B.A., M.L.I.S., J.D., Reference and Student Services Librarian and Clinical Assistant
Professor of Law
AARON R. HARMON, B.A., M.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, B.A., J.D., Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law
JEFFREY MICHAEL HIRSCH, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
DONALD THOMAS HORNSTEIN, B.A., JD., Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law
MELISSA B. JACOBY, B.A., J.D., Graham Kenan Professor of Law
JOSEPH JOHN KALO, B.A., J.D., Graham Kenan Professor of Law
THOMAS A. KELLEY, 111, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs
JOSEPH E. KENNEDY, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
CATHERINE Y. KIM, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JULIE L. KIMBROUGH, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Assistant Director for Collection Services and Clinical Assistant
Professor ofLaw
P. ANNE KLINEFELTER, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Director of Law Library and Associate Professor of Law
JOAN H. KRAUSE, B.A., J.D., Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor of Law; Adjunct Professor, Social
Medicine, School of Medicine and Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health
HOLNING S. LAU, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, B.A., J.D., William Rand Kenan Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law
JON PAUL MCCLANAHAN, A.B., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Academic Success
Programs
RUTH ANN McKINNEY, B.A., M.Ed., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law
STEVEN J. MELAMUT, B.A., B.S., J.D., M.S.L.S., Information Technology Services Librarian and Clinical
Assistant Professor of Law
ROBERT P. MOSTELLER, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and . Dickson Phillips
Distinguished Professor of Law
ERIC L. MULLER, A.B., J.D., Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Dan K. Moore Distinguished
Professor of Law in Jurisprudence and Ethics
RICHARD E. MYERS II, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Dean for Student Affairs and George R. Ward Associate
Professor of Law
GENE R. NICHOL, B.A., J.D., Boyd Tinsley Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of UNC Center on
Poverty, Work and Opportunity
DONNA L. NIXON, B.S., J.D., M.S.L.S., Assistant Director of Public Services and Clinical Assistant Professor
of Law
SAULE T. OMAROVA, PH.D., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JOHN V. ORTH, A.B., J.D., M.A., PH.D., William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor of Law
GREGG D. POLSKY, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Willie Person Mangum Professor of Law
GERALD J. POSTEMA, B.A., PH.D., Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law
KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, A.B., M.A., J.D., PH.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
ALICE A. RATLIFF, B.A., M.A., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law
KATHRYN A. SABBETH, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
OSCAR J. SALINAS, B.A., J.D., M.A., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
SARA A. SAMPSON, B.S., J.D., M.L.I.S., Deputy Director of the Law Library and Clinical Assistant
Professor of Law
MELISSA SAUNDERS, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
MARIA SAVASTA-KENNEDY, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw and Director of the Externship Program
RICHARD S. SAVER, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law; Adjunct Professor, Social Medicine, School of Medicine
and Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health
NICK SEXTON, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.S., Reference and Information Delivery Services Librarian and Clinical
Assistant Professor of Law
JAMES W. SHERWOOD, B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.L.I.S., Reference/Foreign and International Law Librarian
and Clinical Assistant Professor of Law
CRAIG T. SMITH, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Dean for Legal Writing and Academic Success and Clinical
Professor of Law
LESLIE A. STREET, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Reference/Faculty Research Librarian and Clinical Assistant
Professor of Law
WILLIAM J. TURNIER, B.S., M.A., J.D., Willie Person Mangum Professor of Law
JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, B.A., J.D., Burton Craige Professor of Law
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
ARTHUR MARK WEISBURD, A.B., J.D., Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law
DEBORAH M. WEISSMAN, B.A., J.D., Reef C. Ivey 1I Distinguished Professor of Law
ERIKA WILSON, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JANINE M. ZANIN, B.A., J.D., Faculty Supervisor of Externship Programs and Clinical Assistant Professor
ofLaw
Adjunct Faculty
MICHAEL R. ABEL, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
MICHAEL W. BALLANCE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
CHARLES L. BECTON, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor of Law
KIMBERLY C. BISHOP, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
ERIC J. BRIGNAC, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor ofLaw
JONATHAN E. BROUN, B.PH., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SUZANNE M. CHESTER, B.A., J.D., PH.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JOANNA CAREY CLEVELAND, B.A., J.D., M.P.A., Adjunct Professor of Law
MICHAEL W. COHEN, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
FELICE M. CORPENING, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
KEARNS DAVIS, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
THE HONORABLE M. PATRICIA DEVINE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
MARK E. DOROSIN, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
JENNY D. DOYLE, B.B.A., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JAMES C. DRENNAN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
JAMES C. FULLER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
ANTHONY GAETA, JR., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
CALLEY GERBER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
DEBORAH N. GOLDSTEIN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
HARPER HECKMAN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
NORMA HOUSTON, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
MALCOLM HUNTER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
ROBERT O. JENKINS, B.A., M.P.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
SALLY C. JOHNSON, B.S., M.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
VALERIE A. JOHNSON, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE ABRAHAM JONES, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
MICHAEL G. KADENS, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE HARRY MARTIN, L.L.B., L.L.M., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE MARK D. MARTIN, B.S., B.A., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor of Law
THE HONORABLE J. MAiTHEW MARTIN, A.B., J.D., M.A., Adjunct Professor of Law
CARLENE M. MCNULTY, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
WILLIAM S. MILLS, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JOHN M. MOYE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
CHRISTINE C. MUMMA, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MARK OLIVE, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
SAMUEL T. OLIVER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. ORR, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
BARBARA OSBORNE, B.A., M.A., M.ED., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor ofLaw
BETH POSNER, A.B., J.D., M.A., Clinical Professor ofLaw
SCOTT L. SILLIMAN, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
ELLIOT M. SILVERSTEIN, B.A., J.D., PH.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
RAYMOND A. STARLING, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor ofLaw
THOMAS M. STERN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
KATHERINE TOPULOS, B.A., M.A., M.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
DEVON WHITE, A.A.S., B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor ofLaw
CHRISTOPHER M. WILLETT, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor of Law
MELVIN F. WRIGHT JR., B.A., J.D, Adjunct Professor of Law
Faculty Emeriti
WILLIAM BRANTLEY AYCOCK, B.A., A.M., J.D., LL.D., Kenan Professor ofLaw Emeritus
KENNETH S. BROUN, B.S., J.D., Henry Brandis Professor of Law Emertus
HARRY E. GROVES, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Henry Brandis Professor of Law Emeritus
PAUL HARDIN, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw Emeritus
PAUL G. HASKELL, A.B., J.D., LL.B., William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus
RONALD CHARLES LINK, A.B., M.A., J.D., Dan K Moore Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus
ARNOLD H. LOEWY, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Graham Kenan Professor ofLaw Emeritus
RICHARD A. ROSEN, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law Emeritus
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